As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
Of course the person you hurt would still be hurt. I’m talking real world scenarios here that actually happen, not some made up universe where the person you hurt doesn’t actually get hurt. You can escape the consequences of jail time (with money/power) and social ostracism (by choosing immoral friends) in today’s world, and many people can smother their conscience.
I’m asking you to tell me why that it would be reason/not reason enough. (My personal reasons for this are religious.) My argument is that it is irrational to abstain from harming another person for vague “greater good” moral abstractions.
“Feeling bad” is not an abstraction, so we will go with that.
So again... Why does stealing from other people make you feel bad? Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad instead of good when you further your quality of life at someone else’s expense?
Of course the person you hurt would still be hurt. I’m talking real world scenarios here that actually happen, not some made up universe where the person you hurt doesn’t actually get hurt. You can escape the consequences of jail time (with money/power) and social ostracism (by choosing immoral friends) in today’s world, and many people can smother their conscience.
I’m asking you to tell me why that it would be reason/not reason enough. (My personal reasons for this are religious.) My argument is that it is irrational to abstain from harming another person for vague “greater good” moral abstractions.
“Feeling bad” is not an abstraction, so we will go with that.
So again... Why does stealing from other people make you feel bad? Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad instead of good when you further your quality of life at someone else’s expense?
It is reason enough for me, to be honest. The point is, I don't think you managed to show how your position of "abstaining from theft is irrational" is sound. Your two questions have nothing to do with it anymore. Even if we forget about feeling bad, "stealing harms other people which is why I don't do it" is perfectly rational.
@Grammarsalad read my mind. I was going to start with: stealing hurts other people, which makes me feel bad. What scares me sometimes is how religious people require something beyond this... But if @mashedtaters is going to qualify this with "If you remove all consequences" then it also ceases to be a moral dilemma.
@FinneousPJ Ok, so stealing from other people makes you feel bad, which is why you don’t do it: in a way, you could say that you believe in not stealing, and your feelings are your motivation for maintaining that belief (correct if I’m wrong, please).
(I should have qualifed that I was referring to external consequences, such as social ostracism, punishment from the law, etc., not consequences internal to oneself, which can be rationalized away.)
Why does hurting other people by stealing make you feel bad?
Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad when you steal from someone?
What about the consequence of harming another person? Is that also removed in your hypothetical? If not, why is that not reason enough?
@FinneousPJ 2 is not a subset of 1 - as I think your previous posts have in fact showed. It is not possible to both have no belief about the existence of gods (group 1) and to believe that gods do not exist (group 2). While group 2 cannot be a subset of group 1, it is true that the groups are related - both are a subset of a more general group. Perhaps this illustration will clarify the position.
Interesting. Here's why I think you're wrong: the two categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, please see attachment.
OK - I can see why you say that, but that's the result of you applying your own definition of atheism, rather than using the ones I provided in my original statement. The post I made said: "I think part of the confusion is that the term atheist has 2 possible meanings: 1) I don't believe (or disbelieve) that a god or gods exist. 2) I believe that a god or gods do not exist."
I deliberately chose those definitions because they are competing definitions. One is not a subset of the other, which is why it's so difficult to talk about atheism without defining what you mean by it. However, you've based your analysis on a third and looser possible meaning that can encompass both the others, i.e. "I don't believe that a god or gods exist".
The first and third look the same to me...
Let me rephrase my definitions then, this time concentrating on the portion of the first one that you keep disregarding. 1) I don't disbelieve god exists. 2) I do disbelieve god exists. Stated in that form I think it's pretty clear that 2) is not a subset of 1). However, I don't have any further interest in discussing this.
Yes, I agree. However, this is not analogous to your previous categories.
1a) Believing that you shouldn’t “steal” (or insert most moral standards here) if you can escape the consequences is an irrational belief
Very controversial. If you believe that stealing is wrong, then you have a reason to believe that you shouldn't steal. As such, the belief is rational, no?
1b) The proof/argument, as I have illustrated here https://forums.beamdog.com/discussion/comment/1036562/#Comment_1036562 , of this is in the desire of all humans to survive and to better their circumstances, which is our most powerful instinct—disobeying these instincts to survive would be considered irrational by most, I believe it is fair to say (unless you are deferring gratification)
Desires aren't the only things that come into play when it comes you ethical action. You can desire to beat up an elderly woman for blocking your view to the television, but you might refrain from doing so because you believe that beating up elderly women is wrong. I think that would be a rational thing to do (even if you knew or at least believed that you could get away with it).
1c) If you can enhance your quality of life (or what you believe to be the quality of your life), then restraining your capacity to do so for abstractions like “the greater good of society” is irrational because...
1d) ...abstractions don’t directly affect you and your personal or tribal/family survival—we did not evolve to care about abstractions.
We do care about abstractions. A lot. People die in war for abstractions, 'for king and country!', for 'freedom', for 'Justice', etc., all the time. Further, if we didn't care about abstractions, then we wouldn't form societies, institutions, economies, etc. and we'd all be worse off for it.
1e) The principle of deferral of gratification would be a rational reason to not steal, such as fear of the law. But if you can escape the consequences, as I have qualified, this would not apply
Putting beliefs aside, we care about more than personal consequences, as well. We care about justice. We care about right and wrong. The desire to make the world a better place is a reason for action, and thus can make that action rational.
@Grammarsalad I’m not saying people DON’T care about these things. I’m saying it is obvious that they do. The question is WHY? Is it because it is rational on a Darwinian level? Obviously not.
I believe you are missing the context of the conversation. We have been discussing that a belief in God is irrational (not that we aren’t motivated to believe in things for some reason) and that any belief that is irrational should be abandoned. I then drew the same line to morality as an illustration (an argument which has been sidestepped and sidetracked).
The point I am making is that people have irrational beliefs.
One of those is certain prinicples of morality (when capable of avoiding the consequences).
Another is God.
Should we not believe these things just because they are irrational?
I'm not sure what that means, 'rational on a Darwinian level'. Mother love exists because if mothers don't love their children, their children are less likely to survive and thus are less likely to pass their genes to successive generations, but mothers do not love their children because they want to pass their genes to successive generations. That's just not how mother love works.
However, mother love does give mothers a kind of reason for action, a 'reason' why they may act altruistically towards their children. This is basic instrumental rationality: if you desire x, and you take y to be an acceptable means for achieving x, then it is rational For You to do y.
Rationality comes in more or less two 'flavors': instrumental and intrinsic. Instrumental rationality is purely desire based, and there are philosophers, such as Hume, that believe that rationality only comes in this form. That is why he says,
'reason is and ought only to be a slave of the passions.'
It doesn't really matter for the purpose of the discussion why you want x (e.g. whether or not a Darwinian justification can be given for your desire that x). The desire for x gives you a reason for y, and that is all that is required for instrumental rationality.
Intrinsic rationality is more contraversial (for philosophers) and the idea here is that there are some ends that are objectively valuable in themselves, independent of desire, and thus are always rational for agents to set. Moral ends are typically the kinds of ends we are talking about, here (e.g. see Kant's groundwork for the metaphysics of morals--you can get a free PDF of it with a Google search).
But, one might argue that belief in God--in some form or other--is rational in this, or rather a similar, sense. Kant argues that it is rational to believe in God in his second critique (the critique of practical reason, which you almost certainly can get for free online, as well).
Regardless, even if one sticks to instrumental rationality--that's not my bag, but I'm happy to carry it to move things along--many things can be justified as 'rational'.
Edit: but sure, I'll agree that people have irrational beliefs. But we would need a good definition of the sense of rationality we are talking about--REALLY not an easy thing to develop--in order to get a sense of what an irrational belief might look like in order to argue that a belief in God is irrational.
Here, we might look to theories on belief justification:
To me, there is a big difference between when assessing whether a motivation is rational
if you desire x, and you take y to be an acceptable means for achieving x, then it is rational For You to do y.
And whether a belief in a claim about existence is rational
Believing X exists makes me feel good, therefore the belief is rational.
It does not follow that X exists just because believing it does makes you feel good.
Well, according to an instrumental value system, it depends on whether or not you prefer to feel good or whether you prefer to be informed.
But, if we want to say that knowledge is an intrinsic good then we are moving away from an instrumental conception of rationality(which is fine with me).
Edit: though, I should note that a Humean has room to push back. It would be hard for a person to make it in the world if they didn't value knowledge. And people generally want to make it. As such, where they do, they have a reason to value knowledge
@Grammarsalad read my mind. I was going to start with: stealing hurts other people, which makes me feel bad. What scares me sometimes is how religious people require something beyond this... But if @mashedtaters is going to qualify this with "If you remove all consequences" then it also ceases to be a moral dilemma.
@FinneousPJ Ok, so stealing from other people makes you feel bad, which is why you don’t do it: in a way, you could say that you believe in not stealing, and your feelings are your motivation for maintaining that belief (correct if I’m wrong, please).
(I should have qualifed that I was referring to external consequences, such as social ostracism, punishment from the law, etc., not consequences internal to oneself, which can be rationalized away.)
Why does hurting other people by stealing make you feel bad?
Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad when you steal from someone?
What about the consequence of harming another person? Is that also removed in your hypothetical? If not, why is that not reason enough?
@FinneousPJ 2 is not a subset of 1 - as I think your previous posts have in fact showed. It is not possible to both have no belief about the existence of gods (group 1) and to believe that gods do not exist (group 2). While group 2 cannot be a subset of group 1, it is true that the groups are related - both are a subset of a more general group. Perhaps this illustration will clarify the position.
Interesting. Here's why I think you're wrong: the two categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, please see attachment.
OK - I can see why you say that, but that's the result of you applying your own definition of atheism, rather than using the ones I provided in my original statement. The post I made said: "I think part of the confusion is that the term atheist has 2 possible meanings: 1) I don't believe (or disbelieve) that a god or gods exist. 2) I believe that a god or gods do not exist."
I deliberately chose those definitions because they are competing definitions. One is not a subset of the other, which is why it's so difficult to talk about atheism without defining what you mean by it. However, you've based your analysis on a third and looser possible meaning that can encompass both the others, i.e. "I don't believe that a god or gods exist".
The first and third look the same to me...
Let me rephrase my definitions then, this time concentrating on the portion of the first one that you keep disregarding. 1) I don't disbelieve god exists. 2) I do disbelieve god exists. Stated in that form I think it's pretty clear that 2) is not a subset of 1). However, I don't have any further interest in discussing this.
Yes, I agree. However, this is not analogous to your previous categories.
1a) Believing that you shouldn’t “steal” (or insert most moral standards here) if you can escape the consequences is an irrational belief
Very controversial. If you believe that stealing is wrong, then you have a reason to believe that you shouldn't steal. As such, the belief is rational, no?
1b) The proof/argument, as I have illustrated here https://forums.beamdog.com/discussion/comment/1036562/#Comment_1036562 , of this is in the desire of all humans to survive and to better their circumstances, which is our most powerful instinct—disobeying these instincts to survive would be considered irrational by most, I believe it is fair to say (unless you are deferring gratification)
Desires aren't the only things that come into play when it comes you ethical action. You can desire to beat up an elderly woman for blocking your view to the television, but you might refrain from doing so because you believe that beating up elderly women is wrong. I think that would be a rational thing to do (even if you knew or at least believed that you could get away with it).
1c) If you can enhance your quality of life (or what you believe to be the quality of your life), then restraining your capacity to do so for abstractions like “the greater good of society” is irrational because...
1d) ...abstractions don’t directly affect you and your personal or tribal/family survival—we did not evolve to care about abstractions.
We do care about abstractions. A lot. People die in war for abstractions, 'for king and country!', for 'freedom', for 'Justice', etc., all the time. Further, if we didn't care about abstractions, then we wouldn't form societies, institutions, economies, etc. and we'd all be worse off for it.
1e) The principle of deferral of gratification would be a rational reason to not steal, such as fear of the law. But if you can escape the consequences, as I have qualified, this would not apply
Putting beliefs aside, we care about more than personal consequences, as well. We care about justice. We care about right and wrong. The desire to make the world a better place is a reason for action, and thus can make that action rational.
@Grammarsalad I’m not saying people DON’T care about these things. I’m saying it is obvious that they do. The question is WHY? Is it because it is rational on a Darwinian level? Obviously not.
I believe you are missing the context of the conversation. We have been discussing that a belief in God is irrational (not that we aren’t motivated to believe in things for some reason) and that any belief that is irrational should be abandoned. I then drew the same line to morality as an illustration (an argument which has been sidestepped and sidetracked).
The point I am making is that people have irrational beliefs.
One of those is certain prinicples of morality (when capable of avoiding the consequences).
Another is God.
Should we not believe these things just because they are irrational?
I'm not sure what that means, 'rational on a Darwinian level'. Mother love exists because if mothers don't love their children, their children are less likely to survive and thus are less likely to pass their genes to successive generations, but mothers do not love their children because they want to pass their genes to successive generations. That's just not how mother love works.
However, mother love does give mothers a kind of reason for action, a 'reason' why they may act altruistically towards their children. This is basic instrumental rationality: if you desire x, and you take y to be an acceptable means for achieving x, then it is rational For You to do y.
Rationality comes in more or less two 'flavors': instrumental and intrinsic. Instrumental rationality is purely desire based, and there are philosophers, such as Hume, that believe that rationality only comes in this form. That is why he says,
'reason is and ought only to be a slave of the passions.'
It doesn't really matter for the purpose of the discussion why you want x (e.g. whether or not a Darwinian justification can be given for your desire that x). The desire for x gives you a reason for y, and that is all that is required for instrumental rationality.
Intrinsic rationality is more contraversial (for philosophers) and the idea here is that there are some ends that are objectively valuable in themselves, independent of desire, and thus are always rational for agents to set. Moral ends are typically the kinds of ends we are talking about, here (e.g. see Kant's groundwork for the metaphysics of morals--you can get a free PDF of it with a Google search).
But, one might argue that belief in God--in some form or other--is rational in this, or rather a similar, sense. Kant argues that it is rational to believe in God in his second critique (the critique of practical reason, which you almost certainly can get for free online, as well).
Regardless, even if one sticks to instrumental rationality--that's not my bag, but I'm happy to carry it to move things along--many things can be justified as 'rational'.
Edit: but sure, I'll agree that people have irrational beliefs. But we would need a good definition of the sense of rationality we are talking about--REALLY not an easy thing to develop--in order to get a sense of what an irrational belief might look like in order to argue that a belief in God is irrational.
Here, we might look to theories on belief justification:
To me, there is a big difference between when assessing whether a motivation is rational
if you desire x, and you take y to be an acceptable means for achieving x, then it is rational For You to do y.
And whether a belief in a claim about existence is rational
Believing X exists makes me feel good, therefore the belief is rational.
It does not follow that X exists just because believing it does makes you feel good.
Well, according to an instrumental value system, it depends on whether or not you prefer to feel good or whether you prefer to be informed.
But, if we want to say that knowledge is an intrinsic good then we are moving away from an instrumental conception of rationality(which is fine with me).
Edit: though, I should note that a Humean has room to push back. It would be hard for a person to make it in the world if they didn't value knowledge. And people generally want to make it. As such, where they do, they have a reason to value knowledge
That's a good point. I tend to assume people want to be informed, because honestly, there is no way you can made do in life if you don't.
So this actually basically brings us back to a conversation you and I had about two months ago.
How do you know that we haven’t drifted away from morality? What is the metric that you use to measure that?
You told me last time you mostly considered morality to be subjective. Is that still true?
If that is still true, then how do you know the changes have been positive or negative, moral or immoral? As I understand it, subjectivist specifically eschew moral prinicples in favor of “what is best for society,” but that of course in and of itself is subjective.
@mashedtaters I'm impressed you can remember the details of previous conversations - you obviously have a far better memory than me .
I do still think morality is largely subjective and I agree that causes certain problems when you try to assess what's changed over time. The way I tackle that is by considering how things have changed in relation to what we now consider moral, rather than to consider how closely actual events reflected the moral ideals at any previous point in time. My view on that is that there has been a general trend for moral improvement in the world over time - you can see that reflected in things like more equality, less violence and less crime. That doesn't mean I think everything has improved - I think there are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the stability of the family unit for instance - but it seems clear to me that the overall trend for the world has been to become more moral.
Incidentally, I don't think I'm a subjectivist in the way you suggest as I do think there is a need for separate moral principles rather than simply measuring everything against what's best for society. I agree that the latter is important though, for instance: - in helping to establish what morality should be in the first place - in weighing up actions where different moral principles are competing (like the starving child stealing food)
So correct me if I’m wrong, but what it seems like you’re saying in your second paragraph is that the goals posts for both morality AND how you measure that morality shift and move? I would argue that trend has happened (in the west, over a large picture, though not necessarily recently) in general, because people become more committed to objective standards of universal morality.
In your last paragraph, I must take a moment to say that every time someone invoked the cliche picture of the starving child, my first instinct is to always ask why is the child starving? In other words, what moral principle has been violated that led to this child being starved?
I do indeed think that the way morality is both set and assessed changes over time and that seems far more convincing to me than the idea that we're going through a slow process of discovering absolute and unchanging moral standards. Part of the reason for that is that moral standards clash constantly and the way those clashes are resolved changes over time - while not impossible to equate with absolute standards, that process seems to me far more easily explained using relative standards.
You may not like the cliche of the starving child, but the reason it's a cliche is that it's an easy moral clash to understand and consider. It's certainly reasonable to ask the question why is the child starving in the first place, but that doesn't in itself help to answer the question of whether it's morally acceptable to steal in this instance. If you want some different examples of moral clashes to consider though how about picking one of these: - should a father be forced to stay with his family? - should a mother be forced to lead a healthy lifestyle for the sake of her children? - should women / gays / transgenders be prohibited from serving in the army for the sake of maintaining unit cohesion? - is violence acceptable as a first resort against those not following your rules? - to what extent does religious freedom include the right to impose your views on others?
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
That's interesting. I tend to think it goes the other way around. Let's assume instrumentality as it has been put here.
What motive does God have to 'be good'? Let's say that we have a pact with God: we believe in Them, we obey, and they grant us eternal life. Why should They keep their word? They are Rational, after all, no? They can 'get away' with anything, by definition. Why should they honor such a 'pact'? From this (sorry for the length):
"To Dr. Faustus in his study Mephistopheles told the history of the Creation, saying: "The endless praises of the choirs of angels had begun to grow wearisome; for, after all, did he not deserve their praise? Had he not given them endless joy? Would it not be more amusing to obtain undeserved praise, to be worshipped by beings whom he tortured? He smiled inwardly, and resolved that the great drama should be performed.
"For countless ages the hot nebula whirled aimlessly through space. At length it began to take shape, the central mass threw off planets, the planets cooled, boiling seas and burning mountains heaved and tossed, from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain deluged the barely solid crust. And now the first germ of life grew in the depths of the ocean, and developed rapidly in the fructifying warmth into vast forest trees, huge ferns springing from the damp mould, sea monsters breeding, fighting, devouring, and passing away. And from the monsters, as the play unfolded itself, Man was born, with the power of thought, the knowledge of good and evil, and the cruel thirst for worship. And Man saw that all is passing in this mad, monstrous world, that all is struggling to snatch, at any cost, a few brief moments of life before Death's inexorable decree. And Man said: `There is a hidden purpose, could we but fathom it, and the purpose is good; for we must reverence something, and in the visible world there is nothing worthy of reverence.' And Man stood aside from the struggle, resolving that God intended harmony to come out of chaos by human efforts. And when he followed the instincts which God had transmitted to him from his ancestry of beasts of prey, he called it Sin, and asked God to forgive him. But he doubted whether he could be justly forgiven, until he invented a divine Plan by which God's wrath was to have been appeased. And seeing the present was bad, he made it yet worse, that thereby the future might be better. And he gave God thanks for the strength that enabled him to forgo even the joys that were possible. And God smiled; and when he saw that Man had become perfect in renunciation and worship, he sent another sun through the sky, which crashed into Man's sun; and all returned again to nebula.
"`Yes,' he murmured, `it was a good play; I will have it performed again.'"
Could this be God? If so, no thanks. If no, then even God must meet certain standards in order to be God
Edit: I forget who said it, but Dante is Nietzsche's madman's fears realized
Edit2: put another way, once we have taken the step that nothing matters absent God, then God Themselves cannot hope to save us; we have already surrendered to nihlism.
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
Not necessarily, though. People do get away with terrible things and they live 'happy' lives. Nobody caught Jack the ripper, for insurance. Stalin died of natural causes (probably, mostly). I think you're on to something, though. The answer is in that 'other' conception of rationality.
One way to answer the question, 'why do the right thing' is to point out that the answer is in the question: because it's the right thing to do. If one comes to the question wanting to know, 'what's in it for me', there isn't an answer, nor should there be. That question prepossess an undeveloped morality, one where virtue and personal advantage are coextensive.... The world is just not like that.
But, there is an additional way to think about it. When we are considering violating an imperative, we often still want others to obey them. In fact, our violations in a sense depend on others' compliance. What happens to the institution of promising if everybody only kept their promises when they felt like it? No promises can be made, because nobody will trust anybodys' word.a What happens to any system of economics where everybody takes what they want whenever they want? Money becomes worthless, and the economy collapses. What happens to a community when individuals hurt and kill each other as they please? In such an environment, there is no community. This is instead a 'state of nature' as Hobbes envisioned, nasty brutish and short.
These systems are resilient, sure, but they depend on universal agreement in order to exist at all. They require that individuals that want to be a part of a community, to 'bind themselves' to certain standards. One binds oneself through an act of will; what we want is shown in our actions. To act in ways that grossly violate the norms that we want others to follow is to act from a will that wants to live outside of a community, where people do not bind themselves, but act as they please; that is, in a state of nature, where life is brutish, short and miserable. But nobody wants that*. This is a will at war with itself
*Edit: and nobody could want that in committing such a violation because, again, the violation is meant by the individual to be singular--they violate and get ahead while others comply. As such, they will both that such a violation occur and will that the violation is prohibited in the same action; a contradiction that no conception of rationality can support
Of course the person you hurt would still be hurt. I’m talking real world scenarios here that actually happen, not some made up universe where the person you hurt doesn’t actually get hurt. You can escape the consequences of jail time (with money/power) and social ostracism (by choosing immoral friends) in today’s world, and many people can smother their conscience.
I’m asking you to tell me why that it would be reason/not reason enough. (My personal reasons for this are religious.) My argument is that it is irrational to abstain from harming another person for vague “greater good” moral abstractions.
“Feeling bad” is not an abstraction, so we will go with that.
So again... Why does stealing from other people make you feel bad? Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad instead of good when you further your quality of life at someone else’s expense?
@FinneousPJ It is reason enough for me, to be honest. The point is, I don't think you managed to show how your position of "abstaining from theft is irrational" is sound. Your two questions have nothing to do with it anymore. Even if we forget about feeling bad, "stealing harms other people which is why I don't do it" is perfectly rational.
It may be enough for you, but it’s obviously not enough for many, many other people.
As far as the argument itself, there is no more powerful motivator than survival and enhancing the quality of life. Not even our drive to procreate is as powerful. It’s not like I go to work because I would “feel bad” if I didn’t. It’s the same reason we do anything; hunt and gather, do our horrible corporate jobs, and... plunder and steal.
I believe getting what you need is a VERY good reason to steal and murder. But you have provided no counter argument as to why I rationally shouldn’t, other than a vague idea that it makes you “feel bad” to hurt other people. Well, what if it makes me “feel good” to hurt other people? What would you say to convince me not to? How would you rationally prove your belief that stealing is bad?
Is your belief even rational? My argument about stealing certainly is, for it is motivated by the same reason why I and everyone else does anything.
(Edit: changed some wording that didn’t make sense)
(This is all hypothetical, I am not actually a robber or murderer.)
Just because the morality of different cultures in the past has clashed is no reason to believe that there is no fixed standard of true morality.
For example, sciences of different cultures in the past clashed or were incompatible with each other. Some cultures believed the world was flat, and some cultures believed that the world rode around on a giant animal. That doesn’t mean that the principles governing the world itself changed when we discovered that the world was actually a spehere in space.
You will have to provide a better argument than “people disagree on mora standards” in order to say there are no moral standards. People are wrong a lot about a lot of stuff.
As far as the second part of your question, where you listed moral dilemmas, I noticed you omitted some key points that I would specifically ask in each instance. —Why is the father considering leaving? Did he not choose who was going to be the father of his children? Has he no accountsbility for his decisions? —Why should a mother need to be “forced” to lead a healthy lifestyle? (I’m not even sure what that would look like, would the government come in and force her at gunpoint to eat celery?) Is she particularly self-destructive, and if so, why? Does she not care for her children more than her habits? —As far as gays and transgenders, my question would be simple. Did they pass the same rigorous mental and physical health standards as their future peers? —Can you make a rational argument that violence is acceptable as a first resort? I obviously don’t believe this, but you’re the subjectivist. —and lastly... does this religion follow universal objective standards of morality regarding freedom or not?
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
@JLee All you’d have to do to bypass this situation is what people already do: surround yourself with people who won’t ostracize you for harming people outside your tribe.
Though some religions (even modern ones) do believe in a vengeful, disinterested God, the point of Christian faith is not only to have faith that God exists, but to have faith that he perfectly embodies all goodness and virtues, as evidenced through Christ. Thus, it would follow logically that a Christian should try to emulate Christ’s example. And even when there are bad Christians, it wouldn’t be a justifiable excuse, because God is good.
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
Not necessarily, though. People do get away with terrible things and they live 'happy' lives. Nobody caught Jack the ripper, for insurance. Stalin died of natural causes (probably, mostly). I think you're on to something, though. The answer is in that 'other' conception of rationality.
One way to answer the question, 'why do the right thing' is to point out that the answer is in the question: because it's the right thing to do. If one comes to the question wanting to know, 'what's in it for me', there isn't an answer, nor should there be. That question prepossess an undeveloped morality, one where virtue and personal advantage are coextensive.... The world is just not like that.
But, there is an additional way to think about it. When we are considering violating an imperative, we often still want others to obey them. In fact, our violations in a sense depend on others' compliance. What happens to the institution of promising if everybody only kept their promises when they felt like it? No promises can be made, because nobody will trust anybodys' word.a What happens to any system of economics where everybody takes what they want whenever they want? Money becomes worthless, and the economy collapses. What happens to a community when individuals hurt and kill each other as they please? In such an environment, there is no community. This is instead a 'state of nature' as Hobbes envisioned, nasty brutish and short.
These systems are resilient, sure, but they depend on universal agreement in order to exist at all. They require that individuals that want to be a part of a community, to 'bind themselves' to certain standards. One binds oneself through an act of will; what we want is shown in our actions. To act in ways that grossly violate the norms that we want others to follow is to act from a will that wants to live outside of a community, where people do not bind themselves, but act as they please; that is, in a state of nature, where life is brutish, short and miserable. But nobody wants that*. This is a will at war with itself
*Edit: and nobody could want that in committing such a violation because, again, the violation is meant by the individual to be singular--they violate and get ahead while others comply. As such, they will both that such a violation occur and will that the violation is prohibited in the same action; a contradiction that no conception of rationality can support
I agree with your assessment of society’s requirement.
But it is looking at it in a working backwards ideal, sort of like “the end justifies the means,” mentality: “If you want this type of society, than these things are necessary.”
This is my view: morality is absolute, just like physics. Science isn’t as much a method of reverse engineering, though you can certainly use it like that as in your post, but more of a method of discovering what principles of physics are and are not true principles.
Philosophy/religion should be to morality what science is to physics, but controlling people for your own ends is just so damn profitable.
Once you discover what is a true principle, it doesn’t matter what the end goal is as much as it matters that you use that principle correctly. I could give an example if you wish.
You will have to provide a better argument than “people disagree on mora standards” in order to say there are no moral standards. People are wrong a lot about a lot of stuff.
You're referring to the same sort of question as "does god exist?" - it's impossible for science to ever be certain whether there's some sort of moral structure that exists outside the measurable universe. In the past the existence of a god would have seemed obvious to people because they had no alternative explanation for what they saw around them - today we do and it's therefore not at all obvious that there's a god. In the same way, in the past the existence of absolute morals would have seemed an obvious explanation for why people act in the way they do, but we now have alternative explanations based on the use of morals as a means to enable society to function.
I made the point before about the linkage between morality and game theory and that's been amplified above by @Grammarsalad - while it may be rational to act against the interest of the community in a one-off action, the existence of communities depends on ongoing actions, so looking at the consequences of a single action is not the appropriate standard. When experimenting on the most successful gaming strategies, the 'tough love' approach consistently does well. That's a simple strategy - it starts by assuming cooperation with others as that tends to be the way to get most success in the game (just like in life). However, if another player acts against the cooperative interests, i.e. follows the 'rational' approach to maximize returns for a single action, tough love then requires no further cooperation with that player. That seems to me like a good basic model to explain the formation and continued existence of communities, despite the inherent short-term advantages that can be gained by someone acting against the best interest of the community.
As far as the second part of your question, where you listed moral dilemmas, I noticed you omitted some key points that I would specifically ask in each instance. —Why is the father considering leaving? Did he not choose who was going to be the father of his children? Has he no accountsbility for his decisions? —Why should a mother need to be “forced” to lead a healthy lifestyle? (I’m not even sure what that would look like, would the government come in and force her at gunpoint to eat celery?) Is she particularly self-destructive, and if so, why? Does she not care for her children more than her habits? —As far as gays and transgenders, my question would be simple. Did they pass the same rigorous mental and physical health standards as their future peers? —Can you make a rational argument that violence is acceptable as a first resort? I obviously don’t believe this, but you’re the subjectivist. —and lastly... does this religion follow universal objective standards of morality regarding freedom or not?
In relation to asking for additional information, my response to you would be the same as said previously in the case of the starving child - asking how you arrived at a moral dilemma may be useful as a means to try and avoid that in future, but doesn't, in itself, answer the dilemma.
Picking one of the issues I posed, lets look in a bit more detail at the question of religious freedom. In answer to your question on that I don't believe any major religion follows objective universal standards of morality - they all discriminate to at least some degree against people that don't follow their religion. However, the point I was interested in was the extent to which religious freedom for one person should over-ride the preferences of another. Let's take a particular example that's been in the news quite a bit in recent years - the right for muslim women to wear the burkha. Doing that is not a requirement of Islam, but many women feel they should have the right to wear it as a means of expressing their religion. Arguments against that include potential feelings of alienation it can cause and even safety concerns (for instance doctors worried about not being able to see the reaction of their patients). It's an ongoing debate, but there are plenty of countries that have taken legal steps to ban the burkha, despite agreeing with the concept of religious freedom. How would this issue be resolved through absolute moral standards?
Though some religions (even modern ones) do believe in a vengeful, disinterested God, the point of Christian faith is not only to have faith that God exists, but to have faith that he perfectly embodies all goodness and virtues, as evidenced through Christ. Thus, it would follow logically that a Christian should try to emulate Christ’s example. And even when there are bad Christians, it wouldn’t be a justifiable excuse, because God is good.
Assuming God is rational--indeed, assuming God is hyperrational--i.e. God always acts as a fully informed rational Being--then, if I understand correctly, it is irrational to believe that given 1a:
1a) Believing that you shouldn’t “steal” (or insert most moral standards here) if you can escape the consequences is an irrational belief
A mere human would have to follow Christ's example, or risk punishment (let's say). For us, it would be rational to do so (...I guess--I'm not even sure about this. We could act exactly as commanded and we would not be guaranteed to be spared hellfire or oblivion--see below. But I'll grant it to move the story along).But, God? God can get away with anything, being God. As such, it would be irrational for Him hold Himself to (at least) most moral standards. As such, it would be irrational for Him to actually embody all goodness--btw, at this point, I'm not sure what this could possibly even mean. Bring a hyperrational Being, he would not act irrationally--He could, let's say, but He wouldn't because that wouldn't be rational and He's a hyperrational b Being. The story outlined by Mephistopheles is the only plausible version of God. Maybe We're saved, if He's in the mood..or maybe he'll flush us down the toilet on a whim or because of a bet with a nefarious other, or just for fun. All the same, either way. We certainly have no room to complain.
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
Not necessarily, though. People do get away with terrible things and they live 'happy' lives. Nobody caught Jack the ripper, for insurance. Stalin died of natural causes (probably, mostly). I think you're on to something, though. The answer is in that 'other' conception of rationality.
One way to answer the question, 'why do the right thing' is to point out that the answer is in the question: because it's the right thing to do. If one comes to the question wanting to know, 'what's in it for me', there isn't an answer, nor should there be. That question prepossess an undeveloped morality, one where virtue and personal advantage are coextensive.... The world is just not like that.
But, there is an additional way to think about it. When we are considering violating an imperative, we often still want others to obey them. In fact, our violations in a sense depend on others' compliance. What happens to the institution of promising if everybody only kept their promises when they felt like it? No promises can be made, because nobody will trust anybodys' word.a What happens to any system of economics where everybody takes what they want whenever they want? Money becomes worthless, and the economy collapses. What happens to a community when individuals hurt and kill each other as they please? In such an environment, there is no community. This is instead a 'state of nature' as Hobbes envisioned, nasty brutish and short.
These systems are resilient, sure, but they depend on universal agreement in order to exist at all. They require that individuals that want to be a part of a community, to 'bind themselves' to certain standards. One binds oneself through an act of will; what we want is shown in our actions. To act in ways that grossly violate the norms that we want others to follow is to act from a will that wants to live outside of a community, where people do not bind themselves, but act as they please; that is, in a state of nature, where life is brutish, short and miserable. But nobody wants that*. This is a will at war with itself
*Edit: and nobody could want that in committing such a violation because, again, the violation is meant by the individual to be singular--they violate and get ahead while others comply. As such, they will both that such a violation occur and will that the violation is prohibited in the same action; a contradiction that no conception of rationality can support
I agree with your assessment of society’s requirement.
But it is looking at it in a working backwards ideal, sort of like “the end justifies the means,” mentality: “If you want this type of society, than these things are necessary.”
This is my view: morality is absolute, just like physics. Science isn’t as much a method of reverse engineering, though you can certainly use it like that as in your post, but more of a method of discovering what principles of physics are and are not true principles.
Philosophy/religion should be to morality what science is to physics, but controlling people for your own ends is just so damn profitable.
Once you discover what is a true principle, it doesn’t matter what the end goal is as much as it matters that you use that principle correctly. I could give an example if you wish.
This confuses me. If morality is absolute--I actually agree with this wholeheartedly--then it is rational to act morally even if we could 'get away with it'. Being absolute means that there are no contingencies, no possible counterfactual situations where one ought not act morally. No exceptions. Period. This includes God, the Being that could get away with anything. With 1a, and given that God being God could 'get away with it', this contingency is an actuality and so morality is not absolute. Even ignoring God, there would be a counterfactual situation where we could 'get away with it', and so we would not be bound by moral constraints absolutely, either.
(Also, though this can look like a kind of 'ends justify the means' argument*, this is actually a deontological argument for the intrinsic rationality of certain ethical standards--really, it's an argument that it is inherently irrational to act immorally--it's heavily inspired by Kant, who (in)famously rejected the notion of the importance of ends:
"A good will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclinations, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. Even if by some particular disfavor of fate, or by the scanty endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this will should entirely lack the capacity to carry through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, and only the good will were to remain (not of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has full worth in itself".
*Mills saw it that way, so you are in good company, but he is widely believed to be mistaken)
@Grond0 The problem with looking at morality in your first two paragraphs like that is it completely neglects to consider it on an individual level, as in what matters to the individual.
Moral standards can only be achieved on an individual level; it doesn’t matter that it’s “for the greater good” to people you have no connection to. What matters to most people is “me and my tribe.” That’s why religion succeeds, because it’s applied individually and tribally.
I can’t see how you would apply this theory without deception or violence, even if it was viable (which I’m still not convinced), because it assumes that everyone disagrees on what is right but also gives license for someone to decide, subjectively, what is “best” and justify everything by that (which is no) standard. I can also see how it would be abused far more than religion, because there are no way objective standards: what matters is the greater good, which, by its own definition, is subjective. (e.g., at least a priest will still be held one day accountable before God.) in fact, it has been, it just hasn’t been called that. China, Russia, Germany, all used the “for the greater good” argument.
As far as religions, Christians do have universal objective standards of morality regarding freedom: one is “thou shalt not kill.” It applies universally to everyone, and is objective. It is also necessary to maintain that no one can kill in order for freedom to even exist.
Requiring the burka is not a universal standard. Only women are required to wear it. Thus, because it is not universal, we can immediately dismiss it as being immoral edit: to enforce such a standard. (That doesn’t necessarily mean it is immoral if a person chooses, of their own free will, to do so.)
Edit: Sorry, I misread the last part of your post. As far as determining if it immoral to ban burkas, you would use my theory to cut it down: is it applied universally and objectively? Can other women wear anything they want on their face, but not Muslim women? Then it would not be universal. Is it objective? How is a burkha defined? If anything on the face can pass as a burkha, then what about about scarfs? Is it a specific material? Is a specific pattern that is banned? As we start asking these questions about whether or not this can be objectively measured, we realize that there are far too many loopholes for it to actually be objective. So no, we immediately can dismiss this as not being moral to ban someone from wearing something on their face. It also doesn’t appear to be universal, as Muslim women appear to be targeted from facial wear, but anyone else can wear what they wish on their face.
@mashedtaters I am looking at morality at the individual level. The references to wider groups are to explain why individual morality is necessary in order for groups to function. That means evolution can be expected to select for morality as, without some system of morality, the type of human societies we're used to would not be possible - and ultimately that's bad for individuals, not just for the society.
I agree that there's a constant renegotiation of morals as everyone has slightly different standards - but I don't see why that is any more of a problem than the constant discovery and reinterpretation of morals required if you believe there are absolute standards (and it's just that some people are ahead of others in their knowledge of what those are). In either case there's a need to achieve some level of consensus - whether that's imposed or not.
I don't agree at all that Christians have universal objective standards of morality about anything. Even in the case of something as apparently simple as "thou shalt not kill" the reality is that the standard is "thou shalt not kill except in the following circumstances" - those circumstances change over time and are subject to constant arguments between Christians as well as in wider society.
In relation to banning burkhas, as far as I know all the laws enacted on this relate to the clothing and not to any particular religion - so they would be universal. The laws would certainly intend to be objective, but in practice I agree there's always a subjective element in determining acceptable behavior - that's the case whether we're talking about a specific law or a universal moral standard.
I did want to talk a bit about game theory, in relation to a kind of Darwinian based rationality..I put it aside because I thought it would distract. But, it is an interesting way to approach these issues and I'm glad @Grond0 is taking about it. I've... Missed a few details about the conversation, though.
The problem with looking at morality in your first two paragraphs like that is it completely neglects to consider it on an individual level, as in what matters to the individual
Game theory--evolutionary game theory in particular--can potentially model the decisions of individuals quite well because individuals act in a dynamic, and evolving world. Even if one only cares about 'me and my tribe', one has to consider how ones actions now will affect interactions in the future. Perhaps a small gain today will translate into larger losses tomorrow for your tribe. Maybe you can steal from a neighboring tribe and get away with it because you are the strongest tribe in the area; they can't retaliate, and so there is nothing they can do about it
But, what if this action gives you and your tribe a bad reputation with all surrounding tribes? This hit to your rep--hey, reputation is in BG!--may turn out to be bad for your tribe in the long run. Heh, maybe they will all raise the prices slightly in their shop when you or yours go there, slowly bleeding you of go...er money over time. This potential loss over time may make it (instrumentally) rational to refrain from cheating members of other tribes, even if in specific instances where you can get away with it.
Though some religions (even modern ones) do believe in a vengeful, disinterested God, the point of Christian faith is not only to have faith that God exists, but to have faith that he perfectly embodies all goodness and virtues, as evidenced through Christ. Thus, it would follow logically that a Christian should try to emulate Christ’s example. And even when there are bad Christians, it wouldn’t be a justifiable excuse, because God is good.
Assuming God is rational--indeed, assuming God is hyperrational--i.e. God always acts as a fully informed rational Being--then, if I understand correctly, it is irrational to believe that given 1a:
1a) Believing that you shouldn’t “steal” (or insert most moral standards here) if you can escape the consequences is an irrational belief
A mere human would have to follow Christ's example, or risk punishment (let's say). For us, it would be rational to do so (...I guess--I'm not even sure about this. We could act exactly as commanded and we would not be guaranteed to be spared hellfire or oblivion--see below. But I'll grant it to move the story along).But, God? God can get away with anything, being God. As such, it would be irrational for Him hold Himself to (at least) most moral standards. As such, it would be irrational for Him to actually embody all goodness--btw, at this point, I'm not sure what this could possibly even mean. Bring a hyperrational Being, he would not act irrationally--He could, let's say, but He wouldn't because that wouldn't be rational and He's a hyperrational b Being. The story outlined by Mephistopheles is the only plausible version of God. Maybe We're saved, if He's in the mood..or maybe he'll flush us down the toilet on a whim or because of a bet with a nefarious other, or just for fun. All the same, either way. We certainly have no room to complain.
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
Not necessarily, though. People do get away with terrible things and they live 'happy' lives. Nobody caught Jack the ripper, for insurance. Stalin died of natural causes (probably, mostly). I think you're on to something, though. The answer is in that 'other' conception of rationality.
One way to answer the question, 'why do the right thing' is to point out that the answer is in the question: because it's the right thing to do. If one comes to the question wanting to know, 'what's in it for me', there isn't an answer, nor should there be. That question prepossess an undeveloped morality, one where virtue and personal advantage are coextensive.... The world is just not like that.
But, there is an additional way to think about it. When we are considering violating an imperative, we often still want others to obey them. In fact, our violations in a sense depend on others' compliance. What happens to the institution of promising if everybody only kept their promises when they felt like it? No promises can be made, because nobody will trust anybodys' word.a What happens to any system of economics where everybody takes what they want whenever they want? Money becomes worthless, and the economy collapses. What happens to a community when individuals hurt and kill each other as they please? In such an environment, there is no community. This is instead a 'state of nature' as Hobbes envisioned, nasty brutish and short.
These systems are resilient, sure, but they depend on universal agreement in order to exist at all. They require that individuals that want to be a part of a community, to 'bind themselves' to certain standards. One binds oneself through an act of will; what we want is shown in our actions. To act in ways that grossly violate the norms that we want others to follow is to act from a will that wants to live outside of a community, where people do not bind themselves, but act as they please; that is, in a state of nature, where life is brutish, short and miserable. But nobody wants that*. This is a will at war with itself
*Edit: and nobody could want that in committing such a violation because, again, the violation is meant by the individual to be singular--they violate and get ahead while others comply. As such, they will both that such a violation occur and will that the violation is prohibited in the same action; a contradiction that no conception of rationality can support
I agree with your assessment of society’s requirement.
But it is looking at it in a working backwards ideal, sort of like “the end justifies the means,” mentality: “If you want this type of society, than these things are necessary.”
This is my view: morality is absolute, just like physics. Science isn’t as much a method of reverse engineering, though you can certainly use it like that as in your post, but more of a method of discovering what principles of physics are and are not true principles.
Philosophy/religion should be to morality what science is to physics, but controlling people for your own ends is just so damn profitable.
Once you discover what is a true principle, it doesn’t matter what the end goal is as much as it matters that you use that principle correctly. I could give an example if you wish.
This confuses me. If morality is absolute--I actually agree with this wholeheartedly--then it is rational to act morally even if we could 'get away with it'. Being absolute means that there are no contingencies, no possible counterfactual situations where one ought not act morally. No exceptions. Period. This includes God, the Being that could get away with anything. With 1a, and given that God being God could 'get away with it', this contingency is an actuality and so morality is not absolute. Even ignoring God, there would be a counterfactual situation where we could 'get away with it', and so we would not be bound by moral constraints absolutely, either.
(Also, though this can look like a kind of 'ends justify the means' argument*, this is actually a deontological argument for the intrinsic rationality of certain ethical standards--really, it's an argument that it is inherently irrational to act immorally--it's heavily inspired by Kant, who (in)famously rejected the notion of the importance of ends:
"A good will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclinations, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. Even if by some particular disfavor of fate, or by the scanty endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this will should entirely lack the capacity to carry through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, and only the good will were to remain (not of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has full worth in itself".
*Mills saw it that way, so you are in good company, but he is widely believed to be mistaken)
Edits: gorram autocorrect!
I understand why this argument confused you.
I was making the argument 1a) from a place of instrumental rationality, or Darwinian evolution, not one as one who believes in God. Because I believe in God, I obviously don’t believe it is rational to steal for many reasons, one of which is I will eventually pay for the consequences of my sins. Also, as I DO believe morality is an absolute, I DO believe that it is rational to be moral. However, it may be confusing to you because i was playing the devils advocate in an evolving conversation that if morality is subjective, then it cannot be rational on an individual level for individuals to be moral, and I was trying to demonstrate how. Does this clear things up?
We can talk about the aspects of God if you wish... I hadn’t intended for this conversation to go that way, but I’m open to it. Many Christian faiths disagree on the finer points of God’s attributes and why he has those attributes.
But most of us agree, as I’m sure @ThacoBell can attest, that he does not sin against his own standards of morality, as evidenced in Christ. In other words, he embodies all the things he tells Christians to be, and we are supposed to reach for that ideal in our personal lives.
Of course the person you hurt would still be hurt. I’m talking real world scenarios here that actually happen, not some made up universe where the person you hurt doesn’t actually get hurt. You can escape the consequences of jail time (with money/power) and social ostracism (by choosing immoral friends) in today’s world, and many people can smother their conscience.
I’m asking you to tell me why that it would be reason/not reason enough. (My personal reasons for this are religious.) My argument is that it is irrational to abstain from harming another person for vague “greater good” moral abstractions.
“Feeling bad” is not an abstraction, so we will go with that.
So again... Why does stealing from other people make you feel bad? Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad instead of good when you further your quality of life at someone else’s expense?
@FinneousPJ It is reason enough for me, to be honest. The point is, I don't think you managed to show how your position of "abstaining from theft is irrational" is sound. Your two questions have nothing to do with it anymore. Even if we forget about feeling bad, "stealing harms other people which is why I don't do it" is perfectly rational.
It may be enough for you, but it’s obviously not enough for many, many other people.
As far as the argument itself, there is no more powerful motivator than survival and enhancing the quality of life. Not even our drive to procreate is as powerful. It’s not like I go to work because I would “feel bad” if I didn’t. It’s the same reason we do anything; hunt and gather, do our horrible corporate jobs, and... plunder and steal.
I believe getting what you need is a VERY good reason to steal and murder. But you have provided no counter argument as to why I rationally shouldn’t, other than a vague idea that it makes you “feel bad” to hurt other people. Well, what if it makes me “feel good” to hurt other people? What would you say to convince me not to? How would you rationally prove your belief that stealing is bad?
Is your belief even rational? My argument about stealing certainly is, for it is motivated by the same reason why I and everyone else does anything.
(Edit: changed some wording that didn’t make sense)
(This is all hypothetical, I am not actually a robber or murderer.)
Yes, as I said, "stealing harms other people which is why I don't do it" is perfectly rational.
However, I'm not arguing for a "should". I am not trying to argue why you shouldn't steal. Your claim was "abstaining from theft is irrational"; there is no should. I am simply calling into question the soundness of you claim.
@Grond0 and @Grammarsalad seem to be arguing for an ought. That is very interesting, but before I move on to that, I would like closure on your earlier assertion. Either abstaining from theft is irrational or it is not, and I would very much like to find out.
Though some religions (even modern ones) do believe in a vengeful, disinterested God, the point of Christian faith is not only to have faith that God exists, but to have faith that he perfectly embodies all goodness and virtues, as evidenced through Christ. Thus, it would follow logically that a Christian should try to emulate Christ’s example. And even when there are bad Christians, it wouldn’t be a justifiable excuse, because God is good.
Assuming God is rational--indeed, assuming God is hyperrational--i.e. God always acts as a fully informed rational Being--then, if I understand correctly, it is irrational to believe that given 1a:
1a) Believing that you shouldn’t “steal” (or insert most moral standards here) if you can escape the consequences is an irrational belief
A mere human would have to follow Christ's example, or risk punishment (let's say). For us, it would be rational to do so (...I guess--I'm not even sure about this. We could act exactly as commanded and we would not be guaranteed to be spared hellfire or oblivion--see below. But I'll grant it to move the story along).But, God? God can get away with anything, being God. As such, it would be irrational for Him hold Himself to (at least) most moral standards. As such, it would be irrational for Him to actually embody all goodness--btw, at this point, I'm not sure what this could possibly even mean. Bring a hyperrational Being, he would not act irrationally--He could, let's say, but He wouldn't because that wouldn't be rational and He's a hyperrational b Being. The story outlined by Mephistopheles is the only plausible version of God. Maybe We're saved, if He's in the mood..or maybe he'll flush us down the toilet on a whim or because of a bet with a nefarious other, or just for fun. All the same, either way. We certainly have no room to complain.
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
I find this a very interesting statement and have thought of multiple ways to answer.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
Not necessarily, though. People do get away with terrible things and they live 'happy' lives. Nobody caught Jack the ripper, for insurance. Stalin died of natural causes (probably, mostly). I think you're on to something, though. The answer is in that 'other' conception of rationality.
One way to answer the question, 'why do the right thing' is to point out that the answer is in the question: because it's the right thing to do. If one comes to the question wanting to know, 'what's in it for me', there isn't an answer, nor should there be. That question prepossess an undeveloped morality, one where virtue and personal advantage are coextensive.... The world is just not like that.
But, there is an additional way to think about it. When we are considering violating an imperative, we often still want others to obey them. In fact, our violations in a sense depend on others' compliance. What happens to the institution of promising if everybody only kept their promises when they felt like it? No promises can be made, because nobody will trust anybodys' word.a What happens to any system of economics where everybody takes what they want whenever they want? Money becomes worthless, and the economy collapses. What happens to a community when individuals hurt and kill each other as they please? In such an environment, there is no community. This is instead a 'state of nature' as Hobbes envisioned, nasty brutish and short.
These systems are resilient, sure, but they depend on universal agreement in order to exist at all. They require that individuals that want to be a part of a community, to 'bind themselves' to certain standards. One binds oneself through an act of will; what we want is shown in our actions. To act in ways that grossly violate the norms that we want others to follow is to act from a will that wants to live outside of a community, where people do not bind themselves, but act as they please; that is, in a state of nature, where life is brutish, short and miserable. But nobody wants that*. This is a will at war with itself
*Edit: and nobody could want that in committing such a violation because, again, the violation is meant by the individual to be singular--they violate and get ahead while others comply. As such, they will both that such a violation occur and will that the violation is prohibited in the same action; a contradiction that no conception of rationality can support
I agree with your assessment of society’s requirement.
But it is looking at it in a working backwards ideal, sort of like “the end justifies the means,” mentality: “If you want this type of society, than these things are necessary.”
This is my view: morality is absolute, just like physics. Science isn’t as much a method of reverse engineering, though you can certainly use it like that as in your post, but more of a method of discovering what principles of physics are and are not true principles.
Philosophy/religion should be to morality what science is to physics, but controlling people for your own ends is just so damn profitable.
Once you discover what is a true principle, it doesn’t matter what the end goal is as much as it matters that you use that principle correctly. I could give an example if you wish.
This confuses me. If morality is absolute--I actually agree with this wholeheartedly--then it is rational to act morally even if we could 'get away with it'. Being absolute means that there are no contingencies, no possible counterfactual situations where one ought not act morally. No exceptions. Period. This includes God, the Being that could get away with anything. With 1a, and given that God being God could 'get away with it', this contingency is an actuality and so morality is not absolute. Even ignoring God, there would be a counterfactual situation where we could 'get away with it', and so we would not be bound by moral constraints absolutely, either.
(Also, though this can look like a kind of 'ends justify the means' argument*, this is actually a deontological argument for the intrinsic rationality of certain ethical standards--really, it's an argument that it is inherently irrational to act immorally--it's heavily inspired by Kant, who (in)famously rejected the notion of the importance of ends:
"A good will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclinations, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. Even if by some particular disfavor of fate, or by the scanty endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this will should entirely lack the capacity to carry through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, and only the good will were to remain (not of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has full worth in itself".
*Mills saw it that way, so you are in good company, but he is widely believed to be mistaken)
Edits: gorram autocorrect!
I understand why this argument confused you.
I was making the argument 1a) from a place of instrumental rationality, or Darwinian evolution, not one as one who believes in God. Because I believe in God, I obviously don’t believe it is rational to steal for many reasons, one of which is I will eventually pay for the consequences of my sins. Also, as I DO believe morality is an absolute, I DO believe that it is rational to be moral. However, it may be confusing to you because i was playing the devils advocate in an evolving conversation that if morality is subjective, then it cannot be rational on an individual level for individuals to be moral, and I was trying to demonstrate how. Does this clear things up?
We can talk about the aspects of God if you wish... I hadn’t intended for this conversation to go that way, but I’m open to it. Many Christian faiths disagree on the finer points of God’s attributes and why he has those attributes.
But most of us agree, as I’m sure @ThacoBell can attest, that he does not sin against his own standards of morality, as evidenced in Christ. In other words, he embodies all the things he tells Christians to be, and we are supposed to reach for that ideal in our personal lives.
I see. I mean, sure, that's fine. But, a few things:
1) one can believe in God and accept evolution. There seems to be an implied assumption that these are mutually exclusive. I, in fact, know people that accept evolution and believe in God.
2) No moral or ethical implications follow from evolution. That also seems to be implied here. "Is" and "ought" are different things. Indeed, as Neiman puts it, every moral complaint is an appeal to a counterfactual: things should be better than they, in fact, are. 'The Holocaust shouldn't have happened' implies an "is", 'the Holocaust occurred', and a counterfactual "ought'', 'it should not have happened'.
3) 1a does not follow from the inexistence of God and it is not implied by a more 'subjective' ethical system, like utilitarianism. It does not follow from relativism, nor does it even follow from noncognitivism--the claim that there are no moral facts at all
(e.g. emotivism claims that all moral claims, like 'stealing is wrong', are really just expressions of emotion,I.e. 'stealing is yucky'.
But if you think that stealing is yucky, you have a rational reason to avoid it. I think vomit is yucky, and so I don't lick it when I see it on the street. That's a perfectly rational response given that particular emotional reaction. Edit: importantly, I need not have a ready Darwinian story to tell in order for this to be rational. It is as rational today as it was for someone disgusted by vomit before Darwin was born. Further, there need not be, in principle, any Darwinian story to tell for this form to be an example of instrumental rationality--I could be disgusted by ice cream or coffee, and rationality refuse to eat or drink them on these grounds.)
4) There can be instrumental or subjective reasons to not steal absent God even if one could 'get away with it.' One might think it's yucky, or one might worry about their reputation, or one might care about people other than members of their 'tribe', etc.
5) Belief in God is not an acceptance of some absolutist moral system. These are different things. Indeed, Divine command theory is a kind of relativism--it's not absolutist.
Here's a test: if one thinks that there are absolute moral restraints that even God would Have to abide by, then one is an absolutist. Otherwise, no.
@Grond0 I want to address something real quick you mentioned in passing. "All religions dsicriminate against thouse outsie their group to some extent."
Looking purely at the theology, Chrisitanity doesn't. One of the biggest central tenents of Chrisitianity is that no one is more good or more deserving of mercy than another. We are all equal in the eyes of God, and its not our righteousness that get's us into heaven, but God's mercy. The Bible goes so far as to tell us NOT to judge non-believers because we are all the same. "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone." Of course there are people who use religion as a screen so they can feel protected in their bigotry, but this goes against the theology harder than a salmon swimming upstream.
I'm not saying this is the ONLY relgion that teaches acceptance on this level, its just the example I am intimately familiar with.
@mashedtaters "Because I believe in God, I obviously don’t believe it is rational to steal for many reasons, one of which is I will eventually pay for the consequences of my sins."
I'm reminded of the quote from Lawrence of Arabia, "With Major Lawrence, mercy is a passion. With me, it is merely good manners. You may judge which motive is the more reliable."
It is my experience that all it takes is to understand one's situation, even a little, to see how stealing (and many other transgressions) is wrong. Likewise, I have observed that a fear-driven command to moral behavior creates more "sinners" than it saves. That's just how the mind works. If you tell someone they are going to hell enough, they will either tamp down their impulses into the subconscious out of fear or just say "screw it, I'm going to hell and why bother." In neither case will this result in understanding.
People can rationalize all manner of horrid behavior, but that does not make it reasonable. They hide the truth from themselves. The mind can go through all kinds of gymnastics to avoid looking directly at one's situation. Religions, and to be fair society in general, have given people so many repressions that the subconscious plays a more active role in determining behavior than the conscious mind. This does not make it rational, quite the opposite in fact.
I am still not convinced by your argument that stealing is rational (in the hypothetical situation you created). It can be rationalized, but it is not rational, at least as far as I see it.
Which would you say is a more reliable foundation of morality, understanding or fear?
My position about God existence is based on analytic, linguistic approach regarding things that can be or must be. I agree with Frege and Russell and early Wittgenstein, that language can produce statements that express Fregean pure thought process - sentences that mirror some deep inherent states of matters, true, or at least sensible, in all universes. For example, I think that statement "that widow had never been married in her life" is nonsense, as long as we use English, and we don't do it in poetic, metaphorical way. It's nonsense by necessity, because to be widow you need to be previously married. If you say "that widow never had a husband!", you are simply misusing that word. You can force English to change, so that word "widow" will mean something else (for example, you can make it synonymous to "virgin"), but then you have two words, or one word with two seperate meanings. However, changing English simply changes sounds we apply to meaning, but it doesn't change "deep truth", that to be considered to be person that had husband, you necessarily need to have husband before. One can say "but God is omnipotent, he can do everything! He surely can make someone to be widow despite being unmarried!". I don't find any good explanation how that could work and how that could be translated into language. @JLee said that I might be confusing reality with symbols, and that "Limitations of language do not indicate limitations of reality", but I would posit something entirely opposite - we can state things that cannot be mirrored in reality, and examining language can expose that impossibility. This is what I believe is called nonsense. Unmarried widow is nonsense. Number "x", that is both prime number and can be divided by 50 is nonsense. In other worlds - it is that language that contains facts (and truths, and necessities, and possibilities, and impossibilities, and contradictions, and so on), not the other way around. @mashedtaters noticed that "There are things out there that we haven't discovered yet that we don't have language for.". But we do have. We can call them "things we don't have language for". For things we truly don't have language for - we have to be silent and omit them, but, naturally, that makes them impossible to be discussed. It' s a long rant, but this is where I get to why I posit there is no God. You cannot produce any statement about God, that will have any sense. For a statement to make sense it need to adhere to the rules. If we say "God is all-knowing" we need to presuppose "God cannot be oblivious of anything". If that's the case, then at least we know that he is not omnipotent, and there are things outside of his realm of possibility. If God is stronger than the something, then he can't be weaker than something. I'm not, at this point, refering to what God can do, but what language can do. So if you claim that God is some kind of priviliged being that knows everything, but can make it so he doesn't know something, while knowing that, and so on - then he is not "all-knowing", but "all-knowing 2". After we define "all-knowing 2" we have to either assume God is restrained by that definition, or posit "all-knowing 3". That way, we can go ad infinitium to realise that we cannot apply any quality to God, or say anything about it, positive nor negative. So God is blank space in language, and cannot have any part in any truth about a world.
Above applies mostly to transcendent God, the one that is supposedly about our language and understanding. @Grammarsalad pointed out - rightly so - that there are theologians that would accept the above, and rather posit a God who moves within trails of logical possibilities. If that's the case, I can only say that this kind of position assumes beings that do not have to be - or at least I am not aware of any reason we should say there is a God. There is no contradiction in that, but I'd like to see good reasoning for such practice. So the question is - on what basis do we supplement our metaphysics with beings we do not have to assume?
I did my best with being precise with my thought process. I did not provide sylogism, because my thinking goes about why we trust them, and I hope that after my lengthy explanation is clear why transcedent God wouldn't work as a part of one.
@Grond0 I want to address something real quick you mentioned in passing. "All religions dsicriminate against thouse outsie their group to some extent."
Looking purely at the theology, Chrisitanity doesn't. One of the biggest central tenents of Chrisitianity is that no one is more good or more deserving of mercy than another. We are all equal in the eyes of God, and its not our righteousness that get's us into heaven, but God's mercy. The Bible goes so far as to tell us NOT to judge non-believers because we are all the same. "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone." Of course there are people who use religion as a screen so they can feel protected in their bigotry, but this goes against the theology harder than a salmon swimming upstream.
I'm not saying this is the ONLY relgion that teaches acceptance on this level, its just the example I am intimately familiar with.
I really like this interpretation of Christianity. More of this! A lot more of this... Please?!?
@JLee you are anticipating Kant! I think you would really benefit from reading his groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. I think you would enjoy it.
That reminds me...
I have something more to say about rationality. An analysis of rationality is essentially an analysis of means and ends. By ends, I mean something like 'goals', things we would like to achieve. By means, I mean the available strategies, tools, etc. that one might use to achieve those ends.
When we are talking about instrumental rationality, we are evaluating means. If an agent has set end x for themselves, and y is the best means they have to achieve that end, then if they employ y, then they are acting rationality. That is, given that they desire end x, if they employ y, then they are acting rationally.
Often, an assumed end in the 'God debates' is knowledge of whether or not God exists. Often debates either center around the best means to achieve that end, or the means is assumed and the debate instead centers on how that strategy speaks to the question, what answer does it give.
For example, 'new atheists' tend to interpret the question, 'does God exist' as an empirical question. As such, they tend to turn to the sciences for the answer. Sometimes, they find resistance from theists about this, and sometimes theists will claim that the evidence actually suggests that God does, in fact, exist.
Another way to evaluate rationality is by focusing on the ends. Here, it is not enough that some agent has set x as an end for themselves. We can still ask, 'is x a worthy end to set'? If the answer is yes, then we can say that x is a rational, or at least not irrational--we might use the word 'reasonable' here--goal. If the answer is no, then we might say that x is an irrational end to set. In this case, we may not even care about the means. As such, if an agent sets 'theft of that homeless person's socks' as an end, and they use the most effective means to steal those socks, we might say that, in one sense they are acting rationally--they used the best available means--but that they are acting irrationally in another sense--they have not set rational ends for themselves. Perhaps a less contraversial example is a drug addict that sets 'getting another fix' as an end even when these fixes are killing them.
Both atheists and theists tend to agree that a worthy end is to find a definitive answer to the question, 'does God exist'.
However, one agnostic position can be that this is not a worthy end at all, perhaps because it is an unanswerable question and/or because it doesn't really matter either way. Ought implies can, and if the question is not answerable, for whatever reason, it's not a sensible goal to find the answer
An Ignostic--no, I didn't spell that incorrectly--position is that the question itself is senseless, as there are no coherent conditions of satisfaction that could inform us of what an answer to the question might look like. We might as well be asking, does defjisjj exist.
I interpret @Artona s position to be at least sympathetic wilh some form of ignosticism. Edit: Anyway, the notion of intrinsic rationality comes into play in the analysis of ends. The notion of 'intrinsic' has different senses, but the basic meaning is that an end v has intrinsic worth, or is considered to have intrinsic worth, if it is 'good in itself'. This is contasted with something having instrumental worth; such a thing is only valuable, or thought to be valuable, if is is only valuable because it is a means to some other end. An example of something with only instrumental value is money: it's only valuable because with it we can get something that we actual value, like Baldurs gate.
Something is generally considered intrinsically valuable if it either plays an essential role in 'the good life'--like good health, for Aristotle-- or if it is an 'unqualified good', like the good will, for Kant
@Grond0 I want to address something real quick you mentioned in passing. "All religions dsicriminate against thouse outsie their group to some extent."
Looking purely at the theology, Chrisitanity doesn't. One of the biggest central tenents of Chrisitianity is that no one is more good or more deserving of mercy than another. We are all equal in the eyes of God, and its not our righteousness that get's us into heaven, but God's mercy. The Bible goes so far as to tell us NOT to judge non-believers because we are all the same. "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone." Of course there are people who use religion as a screen so they can feel protected in their bigotry, but this goes against the theology harder than a salmon swimming upstream.
I'm not saying this is the ONLY relgion that teaches acceptance on this level, its just the example I am intimately familiar with.
@ThacoBell one of the problems of talking about 'Christians' is that covers a huge range of different groups and ideas. Within that range there may well be some that don't discriminate, but it seems to me there are plenty of examples where there is discrimination (though I do think that has tended to reduce over time). I'm not familiar with the situation in the US, but I think there are lots of areas where discrimination may occur against non-believers, e.g. entitlement to church marriage, adoption rights, faith schooling. There may of course also be structural discrimination within the church, for instance against women and gays, though my impression is that is less of an issue in the US than most countries and it's difficult to disentangle the impact of religious views from those of wider society.
There's also of course the question of whether non-believers can get into heaven. There are statements in the bible that point both ways on that and it's been an ongoing debate since the founding of Christianity. However, until relatively recently I think the general view was that was not possible. There are still Christian groups that do not accept this is possible at all, but I think the general view is now to accept that it is - that's changed over my lifetime with successive Popes helping to move Catholic teaching on this issue over the last 20 or 30 years. It's a pretty nuanced position, but my simplistic view of it is that Catholic teaching is now that: - those rejecting Jesus will not be saved. - those who do not believe in Jesus, but nevertheless act as if they do (honestly following their conscience), will be saved.
I interpret @Artona s position to be at least sympathetic wilh some form of ignosticism.
I did not know that term, but it does sums up my position pretty well. When I googled it, this was one of the first images: http://i.imgur.com/N9qey.jpg Can be useful to make order out of things.
- those who do not believe in Jesus, but nevertheless act as if they do (honestly following their conscience), will be saved.
lol doesn't that make catholicism completely pointless
There have certainly been many people that have made that comment in relation to the movements in Catholic teaching - see this fairly recent critique of the Pope's statements for instance.
On this issue though I'm glad to see the direction teaching is moving in. A basic aim of religion is to bring everyone into a state of grace. While Christians believe it would be great if that could be done through everyone accepting Jesus, what is most important is that they should accept his teachings and gift of redemption for mankind. I think reducing the gap between 'them' and 'us' is a positive step - just as it makes it easier for others to accept religious teaching, I also think it makes it easier for religious people to accept non-religious teaching (for example from philosophy).
Given I tend to have a political outlook as a result of posting so much in that thread, it's perhaps worth making the point that a lot of the discussion in the Catholic Church about this issue reminds me of discussions about the US constitution - in particular the extent to which words should be interpreted according to their original intention. There do seem to be places in scripture that say pretty clearly that non-believers can't be saved (and in this context 'saved' has a distinct meaning from 'redeemed', which applies to the whole of mankind as a result of the intercession of Jesus).
Those taking a rules-based approach feel non-believers cannot get to heaven because that's what the established position of the Church has been based on the scriptures. Those taking the view this is possible are largely drawing on the idea that the Church cannot bind God - he can save anyone he wants to irrespective of Church teaching. This though raises the question of what's the point of having Church teaching on this issue at all - so effectively I think this group are accepting the proposition that the historic interpretation of the scriptures needs to be reinterpreted on this issue (the Church needs to move with the times ).
Comments
Instrumental rationality is what I was talking about when I referred to Darwin, and in my post here: https://forums.beamdog.com/discussion/comment/1036562/#Comment_1036562
As far as intrinsic rationality, I believe that standards of objective morality that we should strive for exist... but...
I have yet to hear any mainstream argument for any type of morality that is compelling, motivating, and convincing, without also arguing for the existence of God. Instead, nihilism and subjectivism defeat morality as logical and emotional arguments, and neither one of those philosophies are objectively moral.
Of course the person you hurt would still be hurt. I’m talking real world scenarios here that actually happen, not some made up universe where the person you hurt doesn’t actually get hurt. You can escape the consequences of jail time (with money/power) and social ostracism (by choosing immoral friends) in today’s world, and many people can smother their conscience.
I’m asking you to tell me why that it would be reason/not reason enough. (My personal reasons for this are religious.) My argument is that it is irrational to abstain from harming another person for vague “greater good” moral abstractions.
“Feeling bad” is not an abstraction, so we will go with that.
So again...
Why does stealing from other people make you feel bad?
Would you say that is a rational position to feel bad instead of good when you further your quality of life at someone else’s expense?
But, if we want to say that knowledge is an intrinsic good then we are moving away from an instrumental conception of rationality(which is fine with me).
Edit: though, I should note that a Humean has room to push back. It would be hard for a person to make it in the world if they didn't value knowledge. And people generally want to make it. As such, where they do, they have a reason to value knowledge
You may not like the cliche of the starving child, but the reason it's a cliche is that it's an easy moral clash to understand and consider. It's certainly reasonable to ask the question why is the child starving in the first place, but that doesn't in itself help to answer the question of whether it's morally acceptable to steal in this instance. If you want some different examples of moral clashes to consider though how about picking one of these:
- should a father be forced to stay with his family?
- should a mother be forced to lead a healthy lifestyle for the sake of her children?
- should women / gays / transgenders be prohibited from serving in the army for the sake of maintaining unit cohesion?
- is violence acceptable as a first resort against those not following your rules?
- to what extent does religious freedom include the right to impose your views on others?
What motive does God have to 'be good'? Let's say that we have a pact with God: we believe in Them, we obey, and they grant us eternal life. Why should They keep their word? They are Rational, after all, no? They can 'get away' with anything, by definition. Why should they honor such a 'pact'? From this (sorry for the length):
https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/264/fmw.htm
"The endless praises of the choirs of angels had begun to grow wearisome; for, after all, did he not deserve their praise? Had he not given them endless joy? Would it not be more amusing to obtain undeserved praise, to be worshipped by beings whom he tortured? He smiled inwardly, and resolved that the great drama should be performed.
"For countless ages the hot nebula whirled aimlessly through space. At length it began to take shape, the central mass threw off planets, the planets cooled, boiling seas and burning mountains heaved and tossed, from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain deluged the barely solid crust. And now the first germ of life grew in the depths of the ocean, and developed rapidly in the fructifying warmth into vast forest trees, huge ferns springing from the damp mould, sea monsters breeding, fighting, devouring, and passing away. And from the monsters, as the play unfolded itself, Man was born, with the power of thought, the knowledge of good and evil, and the cruel thirst for worship. And Man saw that all is passing in this mad, monstrous world, that all is struggling to snatch, at any cost, a few brief moments of life before Death's inexorable decree. And Man said: `There is a hidden purpose, could we but fathom it, and the purpose is good; for we must reverence something, and in the visible world there is nothing worthy of reverence.' And Man stood aside from the struggle, resolving that God intended harmony to come out of chaos by human efforts. And when he followed the instincts which God had transmitted to him from his ancestry of beasts of prey, he called it Sin, and asked God to forgive him. But he doubted whether he could be justly forgiven, until he invented a divine Plan by which God's wrath was to have been appeased. And seeing the present was bad, he made it yet worse, that thereby the future might be better. And he gave God thanks for the strength that enabled him to forgo even the joys that were possible. And God smiled; and when he saw that Man had become perfect in renunciation and worship, he sent another sun through the sky, which crashed into Man's sun; and all returned again to nebula.
"`Yes,' he murmured, `it was a good play; I will have it performed again.'"
Could this be God? If so, no thanks. If no, then even God must meet certain standards in order to be God
Edit: I forget who said it, but Dante is Nietzsche's madman's fears realized
Edit2: put another way, once we have taken the step that nothing matters absent God, then God Themselves cannot hope to save us; we have already surrendered to nihlism.
What about, I find it advantageous to my own ends if the people around me are happy and contented? Stealing and murdering hardly advances the state of contentedness and introduces many problems to a society and subsequently back to me as well. Even if these consequences are not direct, like in your fictitious example, they will still create a negative environment for your protagonist. To behave otherwise is to not understand your situation. No one operates in a vacuum. Is to wish to live within a frightened, suspicious community rational?
One way to answer the question, 'why do the right thing' is to point out that the answer is in the question: because it's the right thing to do. If one comes to the question wanting to know, 'what's in it for me', there isn't an answer, nor should there be. That question prepossess an undeveloped morality, one where virtue and personal advantage are coextensive.... The world is just not like that.
But, there is an additional way to think about it. When we are considering violating an imperative, we often still want others to obey them. In fact, our violations in a sense depend on others' compliance. What happens to the institution of promising if everybody only kept their promises when they felt like it? No promises can be made, because nobody will trust anybodys' word.a What happens to any system of economics where everybody takes what they want whenever they want? Money becomes worthless, and the economy collapses. What happens to a community when individuals hurt and kill each other as they please? In such an environment, there is no community. This is instead a 'state of nature' as Hobbes envisioned, nasty brutish and short.
These systems are resilient, sure, but they depend on universal agreement in order to exist at all. They require that individuals that want to be a part of a community, to 'bind themselves' to certain standards. One binds oneself through an act of will; what we want is shown in our actions. To act in ways that grossly violate the norms that we want others to follow is to act from a will that wants to live outside of a community, where people do not bind themselves, but act as they please; that is, in a state of nature, where life is brutish, short and miserable. But nobody wants that*. This is a will at war with itself
*Edit: and nobody could want that in committing such a violation because, again, the violation is meant by the individual to be singular--they violate and get ahead while others comply. As such, they will both that such a violation occur and will that the violation is prohibited in the same action; a contradiction that no conception of rationality can support
It may be enough for you, but it’s obviously not enough for many, many other people.
As far as the argument itself, there is no more powerful motivator than survival and enhancing the quality of life. Not even our drive to procreate is as powerful. It’s not like I go to work because I would “feel bad” if I didn’t.
It’s the same reason we do anything; hunt and gather, do our horrible corporate jobs, and... plunder and steal.
I believe getting what you need is a VERY good reason to steal and murder. But you have provided no counter argument as to why I rationally shouldn’t, other than a vague idea that it makes you “feel bad” to hurt other people. Well, what if it makes me “feel good” to hurt other people? What would you say to convince me not to? How would you rationally prove your belief that stealing is bad?
Is your belief even rational? My argument about stealing certainly is, for it is motivated by the same reason why I and everyone else does anything.
(Edit: changed some wording that didn’t make sense)
(This is all hypothetical, I am not actually a robber or murderer.)
Just because the morality of different cultures in the past has clashed is no reason to believe that there is no fixed standard of true morality.
For example, sciences of different cultures in the past clashed or were incompatible with each other. Some cultures believed the world was flat, and some cultures believed that the world rode around on a giant animal. That doesn’t mean that the principles governing the world itself changed when we discovered that the world was actually a spehere in space.
You will have to provide a better argument than “people disagree on mora standards” in order to say there are no moral standards. People are wrong a lot about a lot of stuff.
As far as the second part of your question, where you listed moral dilemmas, I noticed you omitted some key points that I would specifically ask in each instance.
—Why is the father considering leaving? Did he not choose who was going to be the father of his children? Has he no accountsbility for his decisions?
—Why should a mother need to be “forced” to lead a healthy lifestyle? (I’m not even sure what that would look like, would the government come in and force her at gunpoint to eat celery?) Is she particularly self-destructive, and if so, why? Does she not care for her children more than her habits?
—As far as gays and transgenders, my question would be simple. Did they pass the same rigorous mental and physical health standards as their future peers?
—Can you make a rational argument that violence is acceptable as a first resort? I obviously don’t believe this, but you’re the subjectivist.
—and lastly... does this religion follow universal objective standards of morality regarding freedom or not?
All you’d have to do to bypass this situation is what people already do: surround yourself with people who won’t ostracize you for harming people outside your tribe.
Though some religions (even modern ones) do believe in a vengeful, disinterested God, the point of Christian faith is not only to have faith that God exists, but to have faith that he perfectly embodies all goodness and virtues, as evidenced through Christ.
Thus, it would follow logically that a Christian should try to emulate Christ’s example. And even when there are bad Christians, it wouldn’t be a justifiable excuse, because God is good.
But it is looking at it in a working backwards ideal, sort of like “the end justifies the means,” mentality: “If you want this type of society, than these things are necessary.”
This is my view: morality is absolute, just like physics. Science isn’t as much a method of reverse engineering, though you can certainly use it like that as in your post, but more of a method of discovering what principles of physics are and are not true principles.
Philosophy/religion should be to morality what science is to physics, but controlling people for your own ends is just so damn profitable.
Once you discover what is a true principle, it doesn’t matter what the end goal is as much as it matters that you use that principle correctly. I could give an example if you wish.
I made the point before about the linkage between morality and game theory and that's been amplified above by @Grammarsalad - while it may be rational to act against the interest of the community in a one-off action, the existence of communities depends on ongoing actions, so looking at the consequences of a single action is not the appropriate standard. When experimenting on the most successful gaming strategies, the 'tough love' approach consistently does well. That's a simple strategy - it starts by assuming cooperation with others as that tends to be the way to get most success in the game (just like in life). However, if another player acts against the cooperative interests, i.e. follows the 'rational' approach to maximize returns for a single action, tough love then requires no further cooperation with that player. That seems to me like a good basic model to explain the formation and continued existence of communities, despite the inherent short-term advantages that can be gained by someone acting against the best interest of the community.
In relation to asking for additional information, my response to you would be the same as said previously in the case of the starving child - asking how you arrived at a moral dilemma may be useful as a means to try and avoid that in future, but doesn't, in itself, answer the dilemma.
Picking one of the issues I posed, lets look in a bit more detail at the question of religious freedom. In answer to your question on that I don't believe any major religion follows objective universal standards of morality - they all discriminate to at least some degree against people that don't follow their religion. However, the point I was interested in was the extent to which religious freedom for one person should over-ride the preferences of another. Let's take a particular example that's been in the news quite a bit in recent years - the right for muslim women to wear the burkha. Doing that is not a requirement of Islam, but many women feel they should have the right to wear it as a means of expressing their religion. Arguments against that include potential feelings of alienation it can cause and even safety concerns (for instance doctors worried about not being able to see the reaction of their patients). It's an ongoing debate, but there are plenty of countries that have taken legal steps to ban the burkha, despite agreeing with the concept of religious freedom. How would this issue be resolved through absolute moral standards?
A mere human would have to follow Christ's example, or risk punishment (let's say). For us, it would be rational to do so (...I guess--I'm not even sure about this. We could act exactly as commanded and we would not be guaranteed to be spared hellfire or oblivion--see below. But I'll grant it to move the story along).But, God? God can get away with anything, being God. As such, it would be irrational for Him hold Himself to (at least) most moral standards. As such, it would be irrational for Him to actually embody all goodness--btw, at this point, I'm not sure what this could possibly even mean. Bring a hyperrational Being, he would not act irrationally--He could, let's say, but He wouldn't because that wouldn't be rational and He's a hyperrational b Being. The story outlined by Mephistopheles is the only plausible version of God. Maybe We're saved, if He's in the mood..or maybe he'll flush us down the toilet on a whim or because of a bet with a nefarious other, or just for fun. All the same, either way. We certainly have no room to complain. This confuses me. If morality is absolute--I actually agree with this wholeheartedly--then it is rational to act morally even if we could 'get away with it'. Being absolute means that there are no contingencies, no possible counterfactual situations where one ought not act morally. No exceptions. Period. This includes God, the Being that could get away with anything. With 1a, and given that God being God could 'get away with it', this contingency is an actuality and so morality is not absolute. Even ignoring God, there would be a counterfactual situation where we could 'get away with it', and so we would not be bound by moral constraints absolutely, either.
(Also, though this can look like a kind of 'ends justify the means' argument*, this is actually a deontological argument for the intrinsic rationality of certain ethical standards--really, it's an argument that it is inherently irrational to act immorally--it's heavily inspired by Kant, who (in)famously rejected the notion of the importance of ends:
*Mills saw it that way, so you are in good company, but he is widely believed to be mistaken)
Edits: gorram autocorrect!
The problem with looking at morality in your first two paragraphs like that is it completely neglects to consider it on an individual level, as in what matters to the individual.
Moral standards can only be achieved on an individual level; it doesn’t matter that it’s “for the greater good” to people you have no connection to. What matters to most people is “me and my tribe.” That’s why religion succeeds, because it’s applied individually and tribally.
I can’t see how you would apply this theory without deception or violence, even if it was viable (which I’m still not convinced), because it assumes that everyone disagrees on what is right but also gives license for someone to decide, subjectively, what is “best” and justify everything by that (which is no) standard.
I can also see how it would be abused far more than religion, because there are no way objective standards: what matters is the greater good, which, by its own definition, is subjective. (e.g., at least a priest will still be held one day accountable before God.) in fact, it has been, it just hasn’t been called that. China, Russia, Germany, all used the “for the greater good” argument.
As far as religions, Christians do have universal objective standards of morality regarding freedom: one is “thou shalt not kill.” It applies universally to everyone, and is objective. It is also necessary to maintain that no one can kill in order for freedom to even exist.
Requiring the burka is not a universal standard. Only women are required to wear it. Thus, because it is not universal, we can immediately dismiss it as being immoral edit: to enforce such a standard. (That doesn’t necessarily mean it is immoral if a person chooses, of their own free will, to do so.)
Edit: Sorry, I misread the last part of your post.
As far as determining if it immoral to ban burkas, you would use my theory to cut it down: is it applied universally and objectively?
Can other women wear anything they want on their face, but not Muslim women? Then it would not be universal.
Is it objective? How is a burkha defined? If anything on the face can pass as a burkha, then what about about scarfs? Is it a specific material? Is a specific pattern that is banned?
As we start asking these questions about whether or not this can be objectively measured, we realize that there are far too many loopholes for it to actually be objective.
So no, we immediately can dismiss this as not being moral to ban someone from wearing something on their face. It also doesn’t appear to be universal, as Muslim women appear to be targeted from facial wear, but anyone else can wear what they wish on their face.
I agree that there's a constant renegotiation of morals as everyone has slightly different standards - but I don't see why that is any more of a problem than the constant discovery and reinterpretation of morals required if you believe there are absolute standards (and it's just that some people are ahead of others in their knowledge of what those are). In either case there's a need to achieve some level of consensus - whether that's imposed or not.
I don't agree at all that Christians have universal objective standards of morality about anything. Even in the case of something as apparently simple as "thou shalt not kill" the reality is that the standard is "thou shalt not kill except in the following circumstances" - those circumstances change over time and are subject to constant arguments between Christians as well as in wider society.
In relation to banning burkhas, as far as I know all the laws enacted on this relate to the clothing and not to any particular religion - so they would be universal. The laws would certainly intend to be objective, but in practice I agree there's always a subjective element in determining acceptable behavior - that's the case whether we're talking about a specific law or a universal moral standard.
@mashedtaters
Game theory--evolutionary game theory in particular--can potentially model the decisions of individuals quite well because individuals act in a dynamic, and evolving world. Even if one only cares about 'me and my tribe', one has to consider how ones actions now will affect interactions in the future. Perhaps a small gain today will translate into larger losses tomorrow for your tribe. Maybe you can steal from a neighboring tribe and get away with it because you are the strongest tribe in the area; they can't retaliate, and so there is nothing they can do about it
But, what if this action gives you and your tribe a bad reputation with all surrounding tribes? This hit to your rep--hey, reputation is in BG!--may turn out to be bad for your tribe in the long run. Heh, maybe they will all raise the prices slightly in their shop when you or yours go there, slowly bleeding you of go...er money over time. This potential loss over time may make it (instrumentally) rational to refrain from cheating members of other tribes, even if in specific instances where you can get away with it.
I was making the argument 1a) from a place of instrumental rationality, or Darwinian evolution, not one as one who believes in God.
Because I believe in God, I obviously don’t believe it is rational to steal for many reasons, one of which is I will eventually pay for the consequences of my sins.
Also, as I DO believe morality is an absolute, I DO believe that it is rational to be moral. However, it may be confusing to you because i was playing the devils advocate in an evolving conversation that if morality is subjective, then it cannot be rational on an individual level for individuals to be moral, and I was trying to demonstrate how.
Does this clear things up?
We can talk about the aspects of God if you wish... I hadn’t intended for this conversation to go that way, but I’m open to it. Many Christian faiths disagree on the finer points of God’s attributes and why he has those attributes.
But most of us agree, as I’m sure @ThacoBell can attest, that he does not sin against his own standards of morality, as evidenced in Christ. In other words, he embodies all the things he tells Christians to be, and we are supposed to reach for that ideal in our personal lives.
However, I'm not arguing for a "should". I am not trying to argue why you shouldn't steal. Your claim was "abstaining from theft is irrational"; there is no should. I am simply calling into question the soundness of you claim.
@Grond0 and @Grammarsalad seem to be arguing for an ought. That is very interesting, but before I move on to that, I would like closure on your earlier assertion. Either abstaining from theft is irrational or it is not, and I would very much like to find out.
1) one can believe in God and accept evolution. There seems to be an implied assumption that these are mutually exclusive. I, in fact, know people that accept evolution and believe in God.
2) No moral or ethical implications follow from evolution. That also seems to be implied here. "Is" and "ought" are different things. Indeed, as Neiman puts it, every moral complaint is an appeal to a counterfactual: things should be better than they, in fact, are. 'The Holocaust shouldn't have happened' implies an "is", 'the Holocaust occurred', and a counterfactual "ought'', 'it should not have happened'.
3) 1a does not follow from the inexistence of God and it is not implied by a more 'subjective' ethical system, like utilitarianism. It does not follow from relativism, nor does it even follow from noncognitivism--the claim that there are no moral facts at all
(e.g. emotivism claims that all moral claims, like 'stealing is wrong', are really just expressions of emotion,I.e. 'stealing is yucky'.
But if you think that stealing is yucky, you have a rational reason to avoid it. I think vomit is yucky, and so I don't lick it when I see it on the street. That's a perfectly rational response given that particular emotional reaction. Edit: importantly, I need not have a ready Darwinian story to tell in order for this to be rational. It is as rational today as it was for someone disgusted by vomit before Darwin was born. Further, there need not be, in principle, any Darwinian story to tell for this form to be an example of instrumental rationality--I could be disgusted by ice cream or coffee, and rationality refuse to eat or drink them on these grounds.)
4) There can be instrumental or subjective reasons to not steal absent God even if one could 'get away with it.' One might think it's yucky, or one might worry about their reputation, or one might care about people other than members of their 'tribe', etc.
5) Belief in God is not an acceptance of some absolutist moral system. These are different things. Indeed, Divine command theory is a kind of relativism--it's not absolutist.
Here's a test: if one thinks that there are absolute moral restraints that even God would Have to abide by, then one is an absolutist. Otherwise, no.
Edit: numbers so no cool face emoji
Looking purely at the theology, Chrisitanity doesn't. One of the biggest central tenents of Chrisitianity is that no one is more good or more deserving of mercy than another. We are all equal in the eyes of God, and its not our righteousness that get's us into heaven, but God's mercy. The Bible goes so far as to tell us NOT to judge non-believers because we are all the same. "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone." Of course there are people who use religion as a screen so they can feel protected in their bigotry, but this goes against the theology harder than a salmon swimming upstream.
I'm not saying this is the ONLY relgion that teaches acceptance on this level, its just the example I am intimately familiar with.
I'm reminded of the quote from Lawrence of Arabia, "With Major Lawrence, mercy is a passion. With me, it is merely good manners. You may judge which motive is the more reliable."
It is my experience that all it takes is to understand one's situation, even a little, to see how stealing (and many other transgressions) is wrong. Likewise, I have observed that a fear-driven command to moral behavior creates more "sinners" than it saves. That's just how the mind works. If you tell someone they are going to hell enough, they will either tamp down their impulses into the subconscious out of fear or just say "screw it, I'm going to hell and why bother." In neither case will this result in understanding.
People can rationalize all manner of horrid behavior, but that does not make it reasonable. They hide the truth from themselves. The mind can go through all kinds of gymnastics to avoid looking directly at one's situation. Religions, and to be fair society in general, have given people so many repressions that the subconscious plays a more active role in determining behavior than the conscious mind. This does not make it rational, quite the opposite in fact.
I am still not convinced by your argument that stealing is rational (in the hypothetical situation you created).
It can be rationalized, but it is not rational, at least as far as I see it.
Which would you say is a more reliable foundation of morality, understanding or fear?
For example, I think that statement "that widow had never been married in her life" is nonsense, as long as we use English, and we don't do it in poetic, metaphorical way. It's nonsense by necessity, because to be widow you need to be previously married. If you say "that widow never had a husband!", you are simply misusing that word. You can force English to change, so that word "widow" will mean something else (for example, you can make it synonymous to "virgin"), but then you have two words, or one word with two seperate meanings. However, changing English simply changes sounds we apply to meaning, but it doesn't change "deep truth", that to be considered to be person that had husband, you necessarily need to have husband before.
One can say "but God is omnipotent, he can do everything! He surely can make someone to be widow despite being unmarried!". I don't find any good explanation how that could work and how that could be translated into language. @JLee said that I might be confusing reality with symbols, and that "Limitations of language do not indicate limitations of reality", but I would posit something entirely opposite - we can state things that cannot be mirrored in reality, and examining language can expose that impossibility. This is what I believe is called nonsense. Unmarried widow is nonsense. Number "x", that is both prime number and can be divided by 50 is nonsense. In other worlds - it is that language that contains facts (and truths, and necessities, and possibilities, and impossibilities, and contradictions, and so on), not the other way around. @mashedtaters noticed that "There are things out there that we haven't discovered yet that we don't have language for.".
But we do have. We can call them "things we don't have language for". For things we truly don't have language for - we have to be silent and omit them, but, naturally, that makes them impossible to be discussed.
It' s a long rant, but this is where I get to why I posit there is no God. You cannot produce any statement about God, that will have any sense. For a statement to make sense it need to adhere to the rules. If we say "God is all-knowing" we need to presuppose "God cannot be oblivious of anything". If that's the case, then at least we know that he is not omnipotent, and there are things outside of his realm of possibility. If God is stronger than the something, then he can't be weaker than something. I'm not, at this point, refering to what God can do, but what language can do. So if you claim that God is some kind of priviliged being that knows everything, but can make it so he doesn't know something, while knowing that, and so on - then he is not "all-knowing", but "all-knowing 2". After we define "all-knowing 2" we have to either assume God is restrained by that definition, or posit "all-knowing 3". That way, we can go ad infinitium to realise that we cannot apply any quality to God, or say anything about it, positive nor negative. So God is blank space in language, and cannot have any part in any truth about a world.
Above applies mostly to transcendent God, the one that is supposedly about our language and understanding. @Grammarsalad pointed out - rightly so - that there are theologians that would accept the above, and rather posit a God who moves within trails of logical possibilities.
If that's the case, I can only say that this kind of position assumes beings that do not have to be - or at least I am not aware of any reason we should say there is a God. There is no contradiction in that, but I'd like to see good reasoning for such practice. So the question is - on what basis do we supplement our metaphysics with beings we do not have to assume?
I did my best with being precise with my thought process. I did not provide sylogism, because my thinking goes about why we trust them, and I hope that after my lengthy explanation is clear why transcedent God wouldn't work as a part of one.
@JLee you are anticipating Kant! I think you would really benefit from reading his groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. I think you would enjoy it.
That reminds me...
I have something more to say about rationality. An analysis of rationality is essentially an analysis of means and ends. By ends, I mean something like 'goals', things we would like to achieve. By means, I mean the available strategies, tools, etc. that one might use to achieve those ends.
When we are talking about instrumental rationality, we are evaluating means. If an agent has set end x for themselves, and y is the best means they have to achieve that end, then if they employ y, then they are acting rationality. That is, given that they desire end x, if they employ y, then they are acting rationally.
Often, an assumed end in the 'God debates' is knowledge of whether or not God exists. Often debates either center around the best means to achieve that end, or the means is assumed and the debate instead centers on how that strategy speaks to the question, what answer does it give.
For example, 'new atheists' tend to interpret the question, 'does God exist' as an empirical question. As such, they tend to turn to the sciences for the answer. Sometimes, they find resistance from theists about this, and sometimes theists will claim that the evidence actually suggests that God does, in fact, exist.
Another way to evaluate rationality is by focusing on the ends. Here, it is not enough that some agent has set x as an end for themselves. We can still ask, 'is x a worthy end to set'? If the answer is yes, then we can say that x is a rational, or at least not irrational--we might use the word 'reasonable' here--goal. If the answer is no, then we might say that x is an irrational end to set. In this case, we may not even care about the means. As such, if an agent sets 'theft of that homeless person's socks' as an end, and they use the most effective means to steal those socks, we might say that, in one sense they are acting rationally--they used the best available means--but that they are acting irrationally in another sense--they have not set rational ends for themselves. Perhaps a less contraversial example is a drug addict that sets 'getting another fix' as an end even when these fixes are killing them.
Both atheists and theists tend to agree that a worthy end is to find a definitive answer to the question, 'does God exist'.
However, one agnostic position can be that this is not a worthy end at all, perhaps because it is an unanswerable question and/or because it doesn't really matter either way. Ought implies can, and if the question is not answerable, for whatever reason, it's not a sensible goal to find the answer
An Ignostic--no, I didn't spell that incorrectly--position is that the question itself is senseless, as there are no coherent conditions of satisfaction that could inform us of what an answer to the question might look like. We might as well be asking, does defjisjj exist.
I interpret @Artona s position to be at least sympathetic wilh some form of ignosticism.
Edit:
Anyway, the notion of intrinsic rationality comes into play in the analysis of ends. The notion of 'intrinsic' has different senses, but the basic meaning is that an end v has intrinsic worth, or is considered to have intrinsic worth, if it is 'good in itself'. This is contasted with something having instrumental worth; such a thing is only valuable, or thought to be valuable, if is is only valuable because it is a means to some other end. An example of something with only instrumental value is money: it's only valuable because with it we can get something that we actual value, like Baldurs gate.
Something is generally considered intrinsically valuable if it either plays an essential role in 'the good life'--like good health, for Aristotle-- or if it is an 'unqualified good', like the good will, for Kant
There's also of course the question of whether non-believers can get into heaven. There are statements in the bible that point both ways on that and it's been an ongoing debate since the founding of Christianity. However, until relatively recently I think the general view was that was not possible. There are still Christian groups that do not accept this is possible at all, but I think the general view is now to accept that it is - that's changed over my lifetime with successive Popes helping to move Catholic teaching on this issue over the last 20 or 30 years. It's a pretty nuanced position, but my simplistic view of it is that Catholic teaching is now that:
- those rejecting Jesus will not be saved.
- those who do not believe in Jesus, but nevertheless act as if they do (honestly following their conscience), will be saved.
I did not know that term, but it does sums up my position pretty well. When I googled it, this was one of the first images: http://i.imgur.com/N9qey.jpg
Can be useful to make order out of things.
On this issue though I'm glad to see the direction teaching is moving in. A basic aim of religion is to bring everyone into a state of grace. While Christians believe it would be great if that could be done through everyone accepting Jesus, what is most important is that they should accept his teachings and gift of redemption for mankind. I think reducing the gap between 'them' and 'us' is a positive step - just as it makes it easier for others to accept religious teaching, I also think it makes it easier for religious people to accept non-religious teaching (for example from philosophy).
Given I tend to have a political outlook as a result of posting so much in that thread, it's perhaps worth making the point that a lot of the discussion in the Catholic Church about this issue reminds me of discussions about the US constitution - in particular the extent to which words should be interpreted according to their original intention. There do seem to be places in scripture that say pretty clearly that non-believers can't be saved (and in this context 'saved' has a distinct meaning from 'redeemed', which applies to the whole of mankind as a result of the intercession of Jesus).
Those taking a rules-based approach feel non-believers cannot get to heaven because that's what the established position of the Church has been based on the scriptures. Those taking the view this is possible are largely drawing on the idea that the Church cannot bind God - he can save anyone he wants to irrespective of Church teaching. This though raises the question of what's the point of having Church teaching on this issue at all - so effectively I think this group are accepting the proposition that the historic interpretation of the scriptures needs to be reinterpreted on this issue (the Church needs to move with the times